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ABSTRACT
The subject of this study is that the psychological contract (PC)
approaches to job mobility within the construction industry with
special reference to migrant construction workers in China. Using
a semi-structured interview to elicit a full range of the PC’s con-
tent of construction worker, we unravel the mechanism of such
contract to influence the informal job mobility of workers through
the lens of the evolutionary game framework. The results demon-
strate that, in the case of fulfilling PC, the informal job mobility of
workers is under control, and both workers and employers benefit
from this situation. This study deepens the understanding of the
PC’s effect on the job mobility of construction workers in China
during the course of economic change. The theoretical and prac-
tical implications are discussed.
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In view of the fast pace and dynamic of economics, the nature of jobs has turned
towards contractual jobs. Many studies suggest that a growing turnover rate is
approaching, and has proved to be a bramble for HR practices across industries.
Unexceptionally, one of the major challenges facing Chinese construction industry is
to retain construction workers, especially high-skilled performers (Sun, Wang, &
Shen, 2018). The changes of relationship between workers and employers result from
the rapid changes in society and construction industries for decades (Schalk & Roe,
2007). The subject of this study is that the psychological contract (PC) approaches to
the job mobility within the construction industry with special reference to migrant
construction workers in China.
A clear, consistent link between a high turnover and a significant negative impact
of organisation performance (e.g., lower productivity, lower employee trust, and loss
of tacit knowledge base of the organisation) are well-established by a considerable of
studies. As Hillmer, Hillmer and McRoberts (2005) suggested, the costs of addressing
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a co-worker who intends to quit by hiring and supervising a new replacer sum up to
70% of the annual salary.
The perspective of the PC is more often used to approach the insight of worker
turnover. Thus, the concept of the PC has always achieved substantial prominence in
turnover management discourse. By conducting two independent studies on the turn-
over intention and actual quit of construction workers in China and Philippi respect-
ively, Chih et al (2016) demonstrated a significantly stronger positive role of the PC
breach in predicting turnover intention of construction workers. As a cognitive
response, turnover intention has been one of the three most investigated responses of
under-fulfilment of the PC (Zhao, Wayne, Glibkowski, & Bravo, 2007). Increased
unfulfillment has proved to be always significant related to higher turnover intention,
lower job satisfaction, and lower affective commitment (Flood, Turner,
Ramamoorthy, & Pearson, 2001). Turnover intention can act as a more direct and
proximal predictor of actual quit and, as such, is defined as the last stage before quit
(Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia, & Griffeth, 1992). In our context, we define the
PC unfulfillment PC as the construction worker’s perception regarding the discrep-
ancy between what were promised and what were actually delivered. By involving an
assessment of what they have received compared to what were promised under cer-
tain conditions, construction workers figure out whether PC are fulfilled.
A review of the previous literature on employee turnover (e.g., Fu, 2007; Paille &
Dufour, 2013) suggests that there are four types of mobility channels: intent to quit
the job, intent to quit the organisation, intent to quit the employer, intent to quit the
profession, all of which might leave the industry. In order to maintain their personal
and/or professional advantages or limit some uncomfortable experiences, workers
endeavour first to search out job alternatives within their industries. Such the willing-
ness to remain in the same industry is also strengthened by the job embeddedness
view to avoid some on and off – the job sacrifices (e.g., loss of employee benefit or
job seniority, loss of social network). Migrants are widely viewed in Chinese society
as moving frequently between jobs (Zhang, 2010). In our migrant construction
worker context, the informal job mobility refers to situations in which worker volun-
tarily and plausibly changes employer, without an application for resignation in
advance when his/her task remains unfinished. The occurrence of informal job mobil-
ity may be attributed to two core choice: (a) the leaver immediately ends the uncom-
forting relationship with the current employer without reference to the ease of
movement and availability of job alternatives (Shipp, Furst-Holloway, Harris, &
Rosen, 2014), (b) the leaver seeks out a better job alternative (e.g., a better pay and
benefits), and perceives the ease of movement. As an employed job seeker (Boswell,
Zimmerman, & Swider, 2012), construction worker searching for another potential
employers may target better employment conditions in terms of pay or status, or exit
of hardship relationship with the current employer.
While the processes of forming and fulfilling or breaching PC has captured an
overwhelming attention from scholars and practitioners, however, there were little, if
any, studies on its content in a specific context; with a great emphasis on its idiosyn-
crasy and dynamic in nature (Millward & Brewerton, 2000), yet such an insight is
critical to elicit a corpus of the desired workplace attitudes and behaviours based
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upon PC. The identification of context-specific contents helps inform where the PC
under-fulfilment has occurred and what lie behind employee turnover. In addition,
despite a well-documented domain regarding the employee response to the PC unful-
fillment in terms of intent to leave, we argue that some issues associated with turn-
over cognitions remain unresolved. For example, what the psychological state of a
voluntary leaver will be in the case of a higher level of PC fulfilment. In this vein, a
feeling of guilt may occur, and subsequently result in some level of psychological
costs (Sun, Aryee, & Law, 2007).
The employment relationship between construction workers and employers entails
a series of trading interactions and an examination of costs and inducements for both
where personal preferences and circumstance dictates. Rabin (1993) pointed out that,
in a game relationship, a player’s utility depends on not only monetary income but
also psychological gratification. Evolutional game theory is based on limited rational-
ity. In this regard, an overwhelming majority of migrant construction workers possess
little knowledge and poor logical thinking and, thus, are limited rational players.
Overall, the application of evolutionary game techniques appears to be a useful frame-
work to resolve and shed light on the evolution of worker–employer interactions.
Curiously, research on construction workers’ job mobility from a PC approach
remains scant. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to use a comprehensive semi-
structured research instrument to elicit a full range of the PC’s content of construc-
tion worker, and unravels the PC’s mechanism to influence the informal job mobility
of workers through the lens of the evolutionary game framework (Weibull, 1997).
In seeking to address these issues, this study endeavours to fill some of the above-
mentioned gaps in three ways. First, the identification of a context-specific content
with reference to construction worker may extend the literature on PC. Second, we
introduce the notion of psychological cost (conceptualised as monetary equivalents
on worker’s values) (Sun et al., 2007) in our model to represent worker’s psycho-
logical state when turnover cognition happens. Three, we adopt an underdeveloped
turnover channel: intent to change employer within the same industry with or with-
out geographical relocation, which may enrich the literature on turnover cognition.
2. Background
Migrants work under informal employment conditions without formal written con-
tracts, about 65% of them have no access to a formal, written contract, and approxi-
mately 20% of migrants end up working in this industry (National Bureau of
Statistics of the People’s Republic of China (NBSC), 2017),
Subject to various factors, such as lack of hukou in urban areas (Zhang, 2010),
uneducated profiles, and low social standing, construction workers have less access to
pay equality, job security, social insurance, paid leave, promotional opportunities,
general training (Sun, Wang & Shen, 2018), welfare services (Nielsen, Smyth, & Zhai,
2010), permanent resident status (Xu, 2013), supervisor support, and distributive just-
ice than general blue-collar workers or local workers in urban China have. These dis-
criminations gradually shape migrant construction workers’ distinctive expectations
or beliefs with regards to their employers or working conditions. Migrant cohorts are
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characterised as (a) inferior to employers, (b) undereducated, (c) having poor cogni-
tive processing and reasoning, (d) undiplomatic, and (e) ignorant of laws.
Comparatively, employers can be described as (a) superior to migrant workers; (b)
inferior to general contractors, who indirectly trigger many under-fulfilment prob-
lems; (c) concerned about their reputations with a concern about in future where all
workers may quit due to his/her notoriety; and (d) time-varying in their decisions to
execute contracts, as whether general contractors fulfil their contracts directly affect
the performances of subcontractor employers towards workers.
Migrant construction workers were selected for several reasons. First, the practice
of not signing formal written contracts, together with workers’ ignorance of laws,
leaves migrant workers vulnerable, with a lack of legal standing to challenge employ-
ers in court (Swider, 2015). Consequently, compared to other labour cohorts, migrant
construction workers have only to resort to PC so as to obtain psychological security.
Second, without effective preventive and remedial measures (Ngai, & Huilin, 2010),
migrant construction workers in China are prone to suffer from PC breach. Once
there is PC breach, migrants are in such weak position that it is impossible for them
to recover all losses, which induces worker’ burnout, and followed by tragic events
(e.g., migrant riot, self-burning). Third, compared to the older-generation migrants,
the new ones have higher expectations with regards to wages, working conditions,
social insurance, career planning, and work-life balance (Franceschini, Siu, & Chan,
2016), their PC represents a dynamic process. Nowadays, tackling their dynamic
expectations is a pressing challenge for construction managers.
2.1. Data collection
We conducted a semi-structured interview with construction workers over six months
in 2016 in Shanghai; we gathered qualitative and quantitative (Yin, 2009) data about
these workers’ job satisfaction and primary concerns by completing a questionnaire
and keeping a field journal, noting observations about the respondents; and we also
interviewed construction managers and labour subcontractors. During all field survey,
we kept daily notes of impressions and recorded informal observation as we partici-
pate in activities such as conflict coordination, reimbursement negotiation, gossip
among some workers. In addition, whenever possible, one of us attended meetings as
a passive note-taker. We sometimes had lunch with construction and had conversa-
tions as we walked to and from work, deepening our understanding of what, how
and why construction workers know, feel and think.
Our interviews are twofold. It began with the personal background of construction
worker (e.g., age, tenure, hometown etc.) and objective questions (e.g., how to get
this job, how to contact your employer). The second part focused on open-ended
questions (Eisenhardt, 1989) that let them relate (a) their overall perceptions and
evaluations of organisational routines and procedures, remuneration package, work-
family balance, psychological stress, industrial rules and prospect, job satisfaction, and
a detailed chronology of job experience, and so on; (b) what they expect from
employers or what employer has promised, what you think employers expect from
you, what promises are important to you, the discrepancy between what were
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promised and what were delivered, how to face or address these discrepancies, and so
on; and (c) when or what conditions intent to leave was triggered, how to decide
movement, what influence your decision, and so on. These probing questions help
establish details. We also gathered secondary data on-site and from the media about
construction worker’ safeguarding rights incidents.
The most frequent words or phrases respondents said are: wages in arrears,
delayed payment, a shortage of safety equipment, safety incidents, long time work
hour, overtime, poor board and lodging, injury, unamiable employer, hard working
condition, no insurance. The survey yielded 259 cases. Respondents were from differ-
ent provinces (29% from north, 24% form south, 31% from east, 16% from west),
and are from rural areas. Ages ranged from 18 to 63 (mean 42 years); almost half
receive a junior-level education nobody receive a high-level education; nobody hold a
supervisory or managerial position. Job tenure ranged from 1 years to 27 years, with
an average of 17 years. Specifically, of the respondents, 135 (53%) planned to move,
178 (69%) were over 40 years of age, 94 (40%) served for 5–15 years, 144 (56%) grad-
uated from junior school, 153 (59%) earned 25–35$ in daily wages, 185 (72%) rated
workmate quantity as less than 15, and 232 (90%) did not sign an employment con-
tract with their employers.
2.2. PC content
Building on the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), the PC is conceptualised as a set
of beliefs and expectations held by employers and employees about their mutual com-
mitments and obligations (Conway & Briner, 2009). A PC may overlap a formal writ-
ten contract (if any), but most are informal and unwritten or include tacit details that
the formal contract does not include (Rousseau, 2000). Reviewing our field journals,
we attempt to define expectations regarding their employers, which constitute the
PC’s content of workers. Iterations of data collection and analysis allowed us to move
inductively from specific observations to more general categorisations.
Focusing on the worker’s perception, we identify their PC’s content, and classify
such content into three levels in accordance with the levels of importance workers
attach to these contents. Being paid on time is what workers care about most (Ngai
& Huilin, 2010), followed by job security (Gallagher, Giles, Park, & Wang, 2015),
whereas general blue-collar and white-collar workers care most about higher incomes,
promotion opportunities, and welfare benefits (Wang, Guo, & Cheng, 2015a).
Specifically, the top level includes: (a) wage is paid fairly and punctually, not in
arrears (Wang, Guo, & Cheng, 2015b); (b) health insurance is provided, injured
workers are sent to medical facilities at the time of injury (Chen & Chan, 2010), and
medical expenses are paid or compensated proactively; and (c) workers cannot be
fired without a valid reason. The second level includes: (a) a skills training program
or technical guidance is provided (Sun et al., 2018); (b) safety equipment is equipped
to protect workers at construction sites; (Ismail, Doostdar, & Harun, 2012); (c) work-
ers cannot be forced to operate in a high-risk environment (Swider, 2015); and (d)
workers are permitted to ask for leave, especially during crop planting and harvest
seasons. The bottom level includes: (a) the work schedule and working hours are
1480 X. WANG ET AL.
arranged reasonably to avoid worker burnout (Choi & Peng, 2015); (b) performance
incentives are set up to reward workers; and (c) humanised management (Choi &
Peng, 2015), to respect and care about workers, is preferred. Usually, employers do
not need to perform all of these activities; however, workers view employers in a
more positive light if they perform more of these activities.
Worker’s PC also specifies what actions they should perform, which are categor-
ised into two levels in accordance with the activities’ perceived importance to employ-
ers. The first level consists of four items: (a) following employers’ commands and job
arrangements and accepting assigned work shifts; (b) carrying out assignments whole-
heartedly and volunteering to do extra work; and (c) being punctual, not being absent
without leave and giving advance notice when quitting. Three items are included in
the secondary level: (a) being available for overtime; (b) obeying working regulations
and acting with care on the job site; and (c) attending vocational skills training to
improve performance.
The higher the frequency is, we define, the more important that content. However,
contents most important to some may be less important to others, that is, importance
of PC content varies with each interviewees. In this point, Steps are taken to assess
the importance every interviewees attach to every PC content by all authors and three
assistants (5 ¼ ‘very important’, 1 ¼ ‘little important’). Then, levels of importance are
conceptualised as latent variables, and confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) are con-
ducted to capture distinctions. The CFA results reveal that the three factor model, v2
(df¼ 45, N¼ 259) ¼ 64.86, CFI ¼.95, RMSEA ¼.041, presents a good fit to the data,
demonstrating clear distinction.
As Rousseau and Mclean Parks (1993) noted, the PC can be situated anywhere
along a continuum from relational to transactional, which represents different con-
tents. They also identified five dimensions that help differentiate between transac-
tional and relational contracts: tangibility, time frame, focus, scope, and stability.
Transactional items are labelled as specific, tangible, narrow in scope, stable, and eco-
nomically oriented, which occurs within a specific timeframe. Relational items are
labelled as open-ended, long-term, broad in scope with the focus on economical com-
ponents as well we socioemotional elements (e.g., trust, loyalty, security). Despite the
two distinct contract forms, their content items have been argued by some empirical
studies to fall into two independent constructs (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000),
which indicates that worker could hold both transactional and relational content
items; namely, transactional and relational aspects can, and do, coexist. Regardless of
where PC locates within the transactional-relational continuum, they should remain
interactive and dynamic at various level of conditions. With its nature and content
depending on the circumstances of the industry and the role of the individual within
it (Rousseau, 2000), the PC’s content is thus specific to individuals, and involves indi-
vidual-level understanding regarding obligations and reciprocity (Herriot, Manning,
& Kidd, 1997). In the present study, the contract forms and emphasise on its dimen-
sions between construction workers and employers should represent dynamic in a
changing work context.
Gibbons and Henderson (2012) argued that building and refining relational con-
tracts requires solving two distinct problems: credibility and clarity. A growing body
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of cases in which workers’ rights were violated by employers almost disintegrated the
credibility of both sides and cut off opportunities for future collaboration.
Furthermore, the poor literacy and cognitive underpinnings and the improvidence of
migrant cohorts create significant impediments to clear communication. Thus, we
argue that the practical difficulties in developing credibility and clarity between work-
ers and employers suggest that building and refining a shared understanding of a
rational contract, which is identically described as an informal implicit agreement to
a PC, will be challenging.
The common practice of subcontracting in the construction industry facilitates
employer’s (subcontractor) use of kinship and placed-based social networks to find
and recruit migrants (Swider, 2015), which fosters a collective work unit consisting of
only a handful of workers (at most dozens). In the relationship-oriented work unit,
workers’ sense of belonging and reciprocal obligation for other is developed.
Sentiment and trust originating from the commonality and identity and kinship
(Ryan, 2011) implicitly force everyone to keep in step with others. Therefore, when
leaving his employer for higher wage, a worker would incur some psychological costs,
especially when he perceived that his employer has fulfilled PC. Psychological costs
are perceived as concerns: (a) the nuisance to employer (e.g., work halt) and subse-
quent offence; (b) the severance of social connections (Li, Sun, & Cheng, 2017) to
employer; (c) a decline of sentiment and trust with others (Ngai, & Huilin, 2010); d)
the spread of a bad reputation, such as infidelity, through the workgroup. PC fulfil-
ment is a matter of degree; however, employer’s poor fulfilment buffers leaver’s con-
cerns. Traditionally, migrants are considerate in return, and always respect leaders,
accept wilfully some level of unequal exchange, and make large commitments to lead-
ers (Liu, Liu, & Ren, 2007). Therefore, if employers well-fulfil PC, workers feel a sig-
nificant amount of responsibility towards their employers (e.g., owing a big favour),
undertake more obligations with great pleasure, and owe high psychological costs
(Sun et al., 2007). Indeed, the theory and research on perceived organisational sup-
port (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002) and work status congruence (Holtom, Lee, &
Tidd, 2002) suggest that workers come to feel obligated to do their best in the interest
of employers that have supported them in exchange for employers’ lasting
PC fulfilment.
Nevertheless, usually pictured as undiplomatic, these migrant cohorts are intui-
tively predisposed to seek job alternatives with a view to limiting further damage in
the face of an ill-performing employer. Critically, we argue that the use of an emo-
tional and intuitive response, rather than engagement in deliberative cognition, exerts
a more powerful influence on integrating employers’ under-fulfilment into workers’
decision making (Bear & Rand, 2016).
3. Evolutionary game model
Understood as a formal object, the concept of a game in evolutionary game theory is
just as it is in classical game theory. Thus, players are assumed to have utility func-
tions, which assign cardinal utility indices to outcomes. In addition, it is generally
assumed that the mathematical expectation of utility (assessed in terms of objective,
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frequency-based probabilities) is the relevant measure of a player’s success. In other
words, at the level of an individual decision, the evolutionary process tends to select
behaviour that maximises expected utility. Evolutionary game theory diverges from
classical game theory only when it comes to the analysis of beliefs. In the classical
theory, players have beliefs about one another, which are grounded in, or at least
consistent with, ideal rationality and common knowledge; their strategy choices are
rational in the sense that they maximise subjectively expected utility, when their sub-
jective beliefs are themselves rational. Evolutionary game theory does not require the
rationality of beliefs (Sugden, 2001).
3.1. Assumptions
The real-employment settings are conceptualised as the following assumptions, which
are helpful in establishing an evolutionary game framework and simplifying
calculations.
Assumption 1: All the players in the game – labour subcontractor employers (not
general contractor employers) and construction workers – are limited rational
‘economic agents.’ Each player’s objective is to maximise income. In addition, both
employers and workers pay close attention to their interpersonal relationships, and
workers possess the virtue of ‘gratitude.’
Assumption 2: The job mobility strategy space of construction workers is X1¼ {yes,
no}. Similarly, the performance strategy space of employers is X1¼ {yes, no}. Usually,
before game begins, neither party can accurately predict how his counterpart will
behave. Because workers hold poor cognitive processing, an intuitive rather than a
deliberative decision-making process is adopted to reflect workers’ responses to their
employers’ behaviours.
Assumption 3: A wide range of job embeddedness studies (see Lee, Mitchell,
Sablynski, Burton, & Holtom, 2004) on turnover have implied that it may be more
difficult to seek out job alternatives in other industries, especially for unskilled aging
workers. The difficulty of moving across industries (e.g., the length of time required
to learn new techniques and adapt to a new workplace) reins in workers’ impulses to
choose a job in another industry.
Assumption 4: Our game model is defined as a limited repeated interaction. A
worker does not necessarily change her/his employer the moment that his employer
enters unfulfillment due to his potential expectation about a future in which the
employer may well-fulfil, and compensate previous under-fulfilment. In addition, an
immediate quit is easy to offend his/her employer, which may cut off opportunities
for future collaboration.
Assumption 5: Workers either fulfil or breach PC subjectively and discrepantly.
Workers breach when their employers have fulfilled heavy but nonmonetary
psychological costs, which are conceptualised as monetary equivalents on work-
er’s values.
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Assumption 6: An employer may discriminate, subjectively and discrepantly, among
construction workers in terms of fulfilment. The use of social interpersonal networks
among co-workers, along with sufficient prior inquiries of co-workers, contributes to
a worker’s understanding of how well a potential employer behaves. Workers always
move towards better-performing employers if they move at all.
Assumption 7: Employers’ fulfilment involves both time and monetary costs but
gains incremental income, such as interest on money that would have been paid as
wages to construction workers.
Assumption 8: Changing jobs when an employer fulfils incurs psychological costs
(e.g., owing a favour or damaging social relations without incurring material costs)
for workers. Otherwise, the only cost to workers might be that of conscientiousness.
Employers’ fulfilment increases the earnings (e.g., the non-occurrence of wage
arrears) of workers and vice versa (e.g., saving recruitment costs).
Assumption 9: Changing jobs when an employer defects incurs few psychological
costs for workers. Psychological costs are therefore related to the extent to which
employers fulfil. The more actions that employers take to fulfil PC’s content, the
higher the psychological costs might be.
Assumption 10: The basic wages for a job are set at roughly the same level among
employers. However, the extent of fulfilling PC varies by employers.
Assumption 11: Job search theory has revealed that job mobility also involves mater-
ial costs, such as residence-moving costs, transportation costs, and living costs. In
turn, employers must incur costs to recruit replacers.
3.2. Parameters
Based on the assumptions, we construct the following variables, with the value of
each variable constrained to be greater than zero.
 When employers breach PC but workers keep stay, employers’ incomes include
workers’ regular contributions to profits, P, and the money earned by breaching
PC (e.g., interest income on wages not paid), P1. The workers’ incomes are the
wages, S, that they receive from employers.
 When employers breach PC and workers leave, workers’ incomes increase by S1
relative to their basic wages S, and mobility costs Mc. We argue that job mobility
can benefit workers, as they move from their former employers (e.g., ones that
withheld wages for long time) to a potential employer (e.g., ceteris paribus, this
potential employer offers a performance-related or annual reward whereas former
employer did not). However, although an employer may seem better-performing
when workers move towards him, he may become an ill-performing employer
over time. Even if workers choose a better-performing employer at first, that
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employer will likely become ill-performing in the future under certain conditions
(e.g., payment delays or non-payment of workers may someday result from gen-
eral contractors withholding payments to subcontractor, because subcontractor’
PC fulfilment are subjected to his/her employer’ fulfilment: general contractor)
(Tran & Carmichael, 2012). Then, workers will seek out a new, better-perform-
ing employer.
 When employers fulfil PC and workers keep stay, employers’ fulfilment costs are Ic,
employers’ incomes increase by P2, and workers’ incomes increase by S2 relative to
their basic wages S.
 When employers fulfil PC but workers move anyway, employers’ fulfilment costs
are Ic, workers’ incomes increase by S3 relative to their basic wages S, workers’
mobility costs are Mc, and workers’ psychological costs arePc:
 After workers have moved to other employers, their former employers incur cost
Rc to recruit replacers.
Based on the assumptions and variables, we establish the payoff matrix shown in
Table 1.
We assume that a worker moves with probability x (0x 1) and keep stay with
probability 1x. Similarly, we assume that an employer fulfils probability y (0y 1)
and breach probability 1y.
According to the fitness function in evolutionary game theory (Cheung &
Friedman, 1998), we assume that, for a construction worker, the expected income of
the mobility is Ud1; the expected income of the non-mobility is Ud2; and the average
expected income is Ud: Based on this terminology, we express the following equa-
tions:
Ud1¼y SþS3McPcð Þþ 1yð Þ SþS1Mcð Þ¼ SþS1Mcð Þþy S3S1Pcð Þ (1)
Ud2¼y SþS2ð Þþ 1yð ÞS¼SþyS2 (2)
Ud¼xUd1þ 1xð ÞUd2¼Sþx S1Mcð ÞþyS2þxy S3S2S1Pcð Þ (3)
Similarly, we assume that, for an employer, the expected income of the PC fulfil-
ment employers is Ut1; the expected income of the PC breach is Ut2; and the average
expected income, is Ut: Based on this terminology, we can express the following
equations:
Ut1 ¼ x PIcRcð Þ þ 1xð Þ PIcþ P2ð Þ ¼ P þ P2Icð Þx Rcþ P2ð Þ (4)
Ut2 ¼ x PRcþ P1ð Þ þ 1xð Þ P þ P1ð Þ ¼ P þ P1ð ÞxRc (5)
Table 1. A general payoff matrix for both construction workers and employers.
Construction worker changes employer
Yes No
Employer fulfil PC Yes PIcRc Sþ S3McPc PIcþ P2 Sþ S2
No Pþ P1Rc Sþ S1Mc Pþ P1 S
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Ut ¼ yUt1þ 1yð ÞUt2 ¼ P þ P1ð Þ þ y P2P1Icð ÞxRcxyP2 (6)
Next, we construct the following replicator dynamics equations about x and y.
F xð Þ ¼ dx
dt
¼ x Ud1Udð Þ ¼ x 1xð Þ S1Mcð Þ þ y S3S1S2Pcð Þ  (7)
F yð Þ ¼ dydt ¼ y Ut1Utð Þ ¼ y 1yð Þ P2 Icþ P1ð ÞxP2½  (8)
According to the basic hypothesis, we can arrive at S3¼S2þS1. In other words, after
construction workers successfully move to other employers, their incremental incomes
relative to base wages have two components: the incremental income, S2, associated
with their former employers fulfilling PC and the incremental income, S1, associated
with their new employers fulfilling PC. Therefore, equation (9) can be condensed to
the following:




Hirshleifer (1977) pointed out that in the evolutionary game model, the trajectory
emitted from an arbitrarily small neighbourhood will evolve towards a certain asymp-
totically stable balance point, which is called the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS).
Given that the population share of mutants is sufficiently small, a certain strategy is
said to remain evolutionarily stable (Taylor & Jonker, 1978).
When the functions FðxÞand FðyÞboth equal zero, we obtain x1¼0, x2¼1,
x3¼P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 and y1¼0, y2¼1, y3¼S1McPc : Correspondingly, we obtain five evolutionary




According to equation (9), if y¼P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 ; all x are ESSs; if y 6¼P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 ; only x¼0
and x¼1 are ESSs. If 0<y<P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 ; x¼1 is an ESS, which means that construc-
tion workers should choose to move when the probability that employers fulfil PC is
less than a specified value. If P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 <y< 1, x
¼0 is an ESS, which means that con-
struction workers may not move when the probability that employers will fulfil PC is
greater than a specified value.
Similarly, according to equation (8), if x¼S1McPc ; all y are ESSs; if x 6¼S1McPc ; only
y¼0 and y¼1 are ESSs. If 0<x<S1McPc ; y¼1 is an ESS, which means that employ-
ers may breach PC when the probability that construction workers will move is less
than a specified value. If S1McPc <x< 1, y
¼0 is an ESS, which means that employers
should fulfil PC when the probability that construction workers will move is greater
than a specified value.
Based on the above logic, evolutionary equilibrium stability depends on
[(S1Mc)Pc] and [P2(IcþP1)].
The first portion of the first term, [S1Mc], is the net earnings of construction
workers that move, namely, the earnings from the new job minus the mobility costs.
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According to the above hypothesis, [S1Mc] is greater than zero; otherwise, construc-
tion workers do not move. As a result, we can consider only whether [S1Mc]
belongs to [0, 1]. From these net monetary earnings of construction workers that
move, we also subtract psychological costs (Pc) to arrive at [(S1Mc)Pc]. If
[(S1Mc)Pc]>0, the net monetary earnings from moving outweigh the psycho-
logical costs of leaving the former employer; therefore, the workers are likely to
move. Otherwise, they may not move.
The latter portion of the second term, [IcþP1] is the net income of employers that
breach PC, including the saved fulfilment costs (Ic) and the money earned (P1) by
breaching PC (e.g., interest income on wages not paid). We subtract this net income
from the net income (P2) of employers that fulfil PC to arrive at [P2(IcþP1)]. If
[P2(IcþP1)]>0, the net income of employers that fulfil PC is greater than that of
those that breach; if [P2(IcþP1)]<0, the net income of employers that fulfil PC is
less than the net income of employers that breach. As a result, we can consider only
whether [P2(IcþP1)] is greater than zero. If [P2(IcþP1)]>0, then P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 must
belong to [0, 1].
Friedman (1991) pointed out that the Jacobian matrix helps in demonstrating
whether an evolutionary game system is stable. As for equilibrium points in a discrete
system, equilibrium points in an evolutionary system reach stability only when the
Jacobian matrix satisfies Det(J)>0 and Tr(J)<0. After solving for the partial deriva-
tives with respect to x and y, we establish the following Jacobian matrix:
J ¼ 12xð Þ S1Mcð ÞyPc
  x 1xð ÞPc
y 1yð ÞP2 12yð Þ P2P1Icð ÞxP2½ 
" #
As was previously mentioned, whether an evolutionary equilibrium point is stable
depends on the values of [(S1Mc)Pc] and [P2(IcþP1)], both of which are either
positive or negative (equalling zero is meaningless, and thus is neglected). Therefore,
four cases are extracted to analyse the stability of the system. Namely, the whole
employment regime are conceptualised as four cases (conditions).
Case 1: (S1Mc)<Pc and [P2(IcþP1)]> 0
In this case, the net monetary income of workers who move is less than their
psychological costs, namely, S1McPc belongs to [0, 1], and the net income of a better-
performing employer is greater than that of a bad one, namely, P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 belongs to
[0, 1]. Based on those values, five equilibria are drawn: E1, E2, E3, E4, and E5, Table 2
shows the results of the Jacobian matrix local stability analysis.
Table 2. Case 1: Analysis of the local stability of equilibria.
Equilibrium Sign of DetJ Sign of TrJ Result
E1(0, 0) Positive Positive Unstable
E2(0, 1) Positive Negative Stable
E3(1, 0) Positive Negative Stable
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Based on the results, we can draw the system’s phase diagram (see Figure 1). As
Figure 1 shows, from any initial state, the system will converge towards E2 and E3,
indicating that both E2 and E3 are ESSs. E2 occurs when employer fulfils PC, a mov-
ing worker incurs high psychological costs, and reluctantly do so. E3 occurs when
employer breaches PC, and a moving worker incurs little or no psychological costs,
and leave for a better employer.
Case 2: (S1Mc)<Pc and [P2(IcþP1)]<0
In this case, the net monetary income of a moving worker is less than psycho-
logical costs, namely, S1McPc belongs to [0, 1], and the net income of a better-perform-
ing employer is less than that of a bad one, namely, P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 is negative. Thus, four
equilibria are captured: E1, E2, E3, and E4, its results of the Jacobian matrix equilib-
rium local stability analysis are shown in Table 3
Similarly, the system’s phase diagram is presented in Figure 2. From any initial
state, the system finally converges towards E3, demonstrating E3 is an ESS. The net
income of a better-performing employer is less than that of a bad one; therefore,
employer reluctantly fulfil PC, which in turn causes a moving worker incur few or no
psychological costs.
Figure 1. Case 1: evolutionary phase diagram.
Table 3. Case 2: Analysis of the local stability of equilibria.
Equilibrium Sign of DetJ Sign of TrJ Result
E1(0, 0) Negative Uncertain Saddle
E2(0, 1) Negative Uncertain Saddle
E3(1, 0) Positive Negative Stable
E4(1, 1) Positive Positive Unstable
Figure 2. Case 2: evolutionary phase diagram.
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Case 3: (S1Mc)>Pc and [P2(IcþP1)]>0
In this case, the net monetary income of a moving worker is greater than their
psychological costs, namely, S1McPc is greater than 1, and the net income of a better-
performing employer is greater than that of a bad one, namely, P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 belongs to
[0, 1]. Thus, four equilibria are drawn: E1, E2, E3, and E4, Table 4 presents the results
of the Jacobian matrix equilibrium local stability analysis.
We can draw the system’s phase diagram (see Figure 3). As shown in Figure 3,
from any initial state, the system ultimately converges towards E3, representing E3 is
an ESS. An employer fulfils PC but not to the extent that a moving worker weight
psychological costs over the net income of movement, so he/she continues to move.
Case 4: (S1Mc)>Pc and [P2(IcþP1)] <0
In this case, the net monetary income of a moving worker is greater than psycho-
logical costs, namely, S1McPc is greater than 1, and the net income of a better-perform-
ing employer is less than that of a bad one, namely, P2ðIcþP1ÞP2 belongs to [0, 1].
Resultantly, four equilibria are captured: E1, E2, E3, and E4, its results of the Jacobian
matrix local stability analysis are shown in Table 5.
Then, the system’s phase diagram is presented in Figure 4. From any initial state,
the system ultimately converges towards E3, implying E3 is an ESS. The net income
Table 4. Case 3: Analysis of the local stability of equilibria.
Equilibrium Sign of DetJ Sign of TrJ Result
E1(0, 0) Positive Positive Unstable
E2(0, 1) Negative Uncertain Saddle
E3(1, 0) Positive Negative Stable
E4(1, 1) Negative Uncertain Saddle
Figure 3. Case 3: evolutionary phase diagram.
Table 5. Case 4: Analysis of the local stability of equilibria.
Equilibrium Sign of DetJ Sign of TrJ Result
E1(0, 0) Negative Uncertain Saddle
E2(0, 1) Positive Positive Unstable
E3(1, 0) Positive Negative Stable
E4(1, 1) Negative Uncertain Saddle
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of a better-performing employer is less than that of a bad one; expectably, employer
breach PC. As such, having realised that movement will increase earnings and current
employer is breaching PC, worker proactively move.
Taken all together, two stable points (E2 and E3) are identified in four cases.
Specifically, E2 exists only in case 1, and E3 exists in cases 1, 2, 3, and 4. E2 means
that employer implements PC, which effectively decreases the probability of move-
ment, worker keeps stay. Conversely, E3 means that employer does not implement
PC, worker will always move. The coexistence of E3 in four cases (employment condi-
tions) uncovers that the frequent movement of worker and under-fulfilment of
employer is a necessary consequence of the ongoing employment regime. As shown
in Figure 1 for case 1, the connecting line made up of points E1, E5, and E4 is the
boundary dividing the upper left and bottom right domains of convergence. Initial
states in the upper left domain would converge towards E2 while initial states in the
bottom right domain would converge towards E3. Consequently, converging towards
E2 or E3 is determined by the connecting line that depends on E5.
E2 represents the desired status of government and migrants. The above discussion
of how equilibria evolve towards E2 may provide a clear guidance on regulating
labour market to government.
5. Discussion
This study builds a theoretical framework to draw several findings regarding the rela-
tionship between the PC and the job mobility of migrant construction workers in the
Chinese context, and makes some contributions in five ways. Through the lens of
evolutionary game framework, rather than social exchange theory, first contribution
is as follows: (1) Despite some similarity with social exchange theory on the conclu-
sion, this process-oriented game model facilitates us to gain insight into the process
of where and how PC under-fulfilment happens, as well as to suggest some targeted
strategies. Building on the mathematical model, sensitivity analysis technique is uti-
lised to determine how and the degree to which the outcome is affected by certain
parameter change while others keep unchangeable. (2) Not just drawing the conclu-
sion that in the case of fulfilling PC, the informal job mobility of workers will be
under control, game framework is also utilised to demonstrate a major failure of the
current employment regime in this industry. The coexistence of E3 in four cases
Figure 4. Case 4: evolutionary phase diagram.
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uncovers that the ongoing employment regime fails to control informal job mobility
of migrants, and also fails to incentive employer to retain leavers. These findings also
verify our field observations in construction sites. (3) We advance job mobility at
work by incorporating the concept of psychological contract and the operationalisa-
tion of tangible (psychological cost) and intangible cost (mobility cost), as well as
benefits, into an evolutionary game framework for the employment exchange rela-
tionship. We extent a leaver’s utility function beyond monetary costs and include in
it the psychological costs that arising from ‘betrayal’.
Second, we shed new light on the nature of the economic and the PC both of
which can reinforce and support each other in a given workplace to yield synergetic
effects on worker’s emotions and behaviours (Sonnenberg, Koene, & Paauwe, 2011),
and improves the understanding of where PC breach happen (what PC’s contents
were broken) and how to make mobility decision under different conditions.
However, our findings indicate that the content of the PC and its effect on job mobil-
ity may not be consistent across workers with different levels of economic considera-
tions. This portion of the content of the PC is important and suggests a novel
boundary condition on the relationship between PC and job mobility. In a specific-
context employment, a joint consideration of both economic and PC helps get a com-
prehensive insight into job motivation, work attitudes, and well-beings. As for
migrant construction workers, who are both peasants and workers, we identified the
contents and role of their PC breach in the job mobility process. Such an identifica-
tion not only responds to the call for further work on migrants’ quality of work life
(Qiu et al., 2011) but it addresses the criticism that prior studies are limited to exam-
ining either the antecedents (e.g., Cohen, 2012) or consequences (e.g., Deery, Iverson,
& Walsh, 2006) of PC breach.
Third, this study advances the job mobility, psychological contract, and construc-
tion labour management literatures by integrating these concepts into a process
framework of the employment game, a novel contribution given the absence of such
a fine-grained understanding in prior research. A good deal of attention has been
devoted to the relationship between PC breach and negative job outcomes (e.g., job
dissatisfaction, emotional exhaustion, turnover) in prior work, however, how these
negative job outcomes occur after PC breach remains a relatively underdeveloped
field in the literature. We focus on the process model, together with PC’s compo-
nents, to present how PC breach causes job mobility, enabling us to better predict
how and why PC breach happens, and how to tackle PC breach and its negative out-
comes. In addition, few researches focused on migrant construction workers job
mobility from PC perspective. We approach a combination of economic and psycho-
logical elements to job mobility of migrant construction worker, offering a relatively
comprehensive and practice relevant view of mobility that helps manger apply a pack-
age of measures to minimising the undesired effect. We emphasise the underdevel-
oped role of psychological cost as a driving factor for the behaviour of workers in
turnover cognition. To some degree, this study explains why the financial model of
payment-turnover cannot accurately predict job mobility in emerging economies
(e.g., China).
Fourth, resolving employment for 280 million migrant (NBSC, 2017) workers has
been long a salient challenge for central and local government. Such migrant job
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issues as online activism, outrage, may have fuelled social unrest, labour action and
social problems which authorities worry about the most (Cheng, Wang, & Chen,
2014). Our specific attentions to migrant construction worker, counting 55 million
(NBSC, 2017) and representing the largest segment of migrants, may provide some
underpinnings for academic research and policy discussions targeting at making
migrants happier and ameliorating their quality of work life in urban China. The ana-
lysis of these issues has depended on specific assumptions regarding employment
rules, industries climate, and players’ beliefs, anyway, we at least demonstrated a
major failure of the current employment regime and the necessity of updating play-
ers’ beliefs and condition of certain parameters in the model.
Fifth, we advances Rousseau and Mclean Parks (1993) and Rousseau and
Tijoriwala, (1998) research on psychological contract in two ways. (1) In the choice
of assessment methodology, use of standardised assessment with qualitative and quan-
titative analysis can and should capture appropriately and validly the generalisable
aspects of setting-specific PC content across workers in a relatively stable context.
Subjective descriptions and self-report as to PC’ content, fulfilment and breach, and
features, help to capture the most direct origins of information with worker’ perspec-
tives unfiltered. (2) In the feature-oriented assessment, we proposed a new contractual
characteristic: importance. In our context of migrants, we found that importance also
helps differentiate between transactional-relational contracts. In comparison to other
characteristics (e.g., tangibility, time frame), we argued that importance is the closest
predictor to migrant’ negative attitudes and behaviours (e.g., anger, turnover).
Importance characteristic of PC content is particularly pertinent to the understanding
of ‘the motivational intensity’ or ‘the impetus to act’ (Warr, Bindl, Parker, &
Inceoglu, 2014) in the face of PC breach. Our interview materials and PC content
analysis furtherly uncovered that in migrant’ PC content, (a) transactional items are
all important, such as payment, social insurance, safety protection, which would incur
worker’ intensively negative attitudes and behaviours once these important items are
breached; (b) both important (e.g., payment, safety protection) and less important
(e.g., trust, respect) items are included in relational contracts, the breach of less
important ones usually incur little negative response. Here, we identified importance
as an additional characteristic to Rousseau and Mclean Parks (1993) research on
transactional-relational contracts. (a) We have furtherly advance the foundation of
transactional-relational contract characteristic. The importance of PC, more so than
PC’ content, are generalisable across various employment settings (e.g., blue/white
collar, occupation). PC’ content depends on employment settings due to the inherent
idiosyncrasy of PC, whereas the underling characteristics (dimensions) of contract
keep generable. Suggesting a common and comprehensive set of characteristics
(dimensions) is sufficient yet parsimonious and manageable to describe transactional-
relational continuum. (b) The importance explicitly incorporates where workers place
certain item along a transactional-relational continuum and the extent to which
workers take certain item as their first choice or preference. (c) Consistent with the
principle of requisite variety, the importance is integrated into existing dimensions
framework. Such an operationalisation will strengthen the development of a coherent
body of knowledge of transactional-relational continuum (McLean Parks, Kidder, &
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Gallagher, 1998), where findings across research can be compared and understood
and provide a consistent guidance to researchers and practitioners.
The results also have implications for policy-makers and subcontractors. We dem-
onstrate that how workers perceive PC under-fulfilment, and assess their gain and
loss before and after job mobility under different conditions, appears to provide a
viable route to tackle its adverse outcomes (turnover). In emerging economics,
migrant workers contribute significantly to urban development but suffer various dis-
criminations (Cheng, Smyth, & Guo, 2015; Wang, Guo, & Cheng, 2015a), including
wage, working situation, job security, social insurance coverage, and organisation
identification discrimination. As environment. As Schalk and Rousseau (2001, p. 141)
said ‘the management of psychological contracts is a core task for firms that attempt
to develop ‘people-building’ rather than ‘people-using’ organisations’. This study pro-
vides clear guidance regarding migrant workers’ concerns and ways to relieve their
informal job mobility in the Chinese construction industry. Informal job mobility has
broad consequences for the construction industry, such labour shortages, labour cost
increases, and the growing likelihood of quality and safety accidents. Once this situ-
ation grows out of control, the whole construction industry will suffer consequences.
Therefore, a sustainable job environment and controlled job mobility are beneficial to
both migrant workers and economic and social development. Our findings contribute
to a better understanding of job mobility issues by focusing on the contents and
affect of the PC, and we emphasise its importance in relieving migrant workers’
informal job mobility.
In light of these conclusions, we also provide some implications for managerial
practices. First, building on the legitimacy and willingness of both construction
worker and employer, a private contract is one way to establish a legal framework,
and should be support to stipulate what obligations employer must fulfil, what obliga-
tions worker must obey, how to penalise violators, and leave adequate room to nego-
tiate in a changing condition. Such a sophisticated private contract may ameliorate
employer–worker disputes (Goetz & Scott, 1981). Second, the government can
develop a contract system with specific terms that cover as much of the PC as pos-
sible. For example, a wage is paid monthly to workers because spiking wage arrears
have been an issue facing migrant workers over the years. By switching to a formal,
written contract, the obligations of both parties can be specified. Therefore, the gov-
ernment can develop an official standard form contract for employers and workers,
tighten subsequent oversight, and crack down on any violations of contracts. Finally,
the study provides clear guidance on the aspects of workers’ PC that managers should
pay attention to, so managers can assess the degree to which the two types of con-
tracts, written and psychological, and then develop worker’ emotional and psycho-
logical attachment, identification with and involvement with this organisation, are
functional by gauging construction migrant workers’ turnover intentions. However,
with PC of new generation migrants changing, a single pattern of monetary interven-
tions (e.g., pay rise) may not always prove effective such job control-oriented induce-
ments (e.g., job autonomy) as promote both the intrinsic and extrinsic value of this
job, should be considered.
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6. Limitations and future research
There are several limitations to this study that suggest valuable research directions.
First, we examined the PC only in a typical industry and country, the construction
industry in China. Thus, our findings may not generalise to other countries or indus-
tries due to varying economic situations, cultural norms, or governance practices.
Second, this study did not consider possible firm-level factors (e.g., talent strategies
or HR systems) or individual differences (e.g., needs of different strengths) that may
shape the contents of workers’ PC and drive our findings. Thus, it would be a valu-
able extension to study whether such factors drive the functioning of the PC. Third,
our findings were drawn through the lens of the mathematical calculation of a pure
theoretical model and lack empirical support, which may limit their practicability.
Therefore, the use of a longitudinal survey and subsequent empirical inference are
encouraged to confirm our results and provide greater insight into the temporal
dynamics through which PC affects the job mobility process, which may strengthen
our results’ generalisability.
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